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Virgil J. Haggart, Jr.*
The recent business recession, which in some areas of the
country has caused rather severe unemployment,' has once again
focused both private and official attention upon the nation's un-
employment compensation program.2 It is the purpose of this
article to consider only one segment of this program: the pay-
ment of unemployment compensation to wage earners whose loss
of work is due to a labor dispute at the place where they were
last employed. Attention will be directed particularly to the pro-
priety of such payments in circumstances where the worker has
some degree of identification with the labor dispute which caused
his unemployment.
I. SURVEY OF FEDERAL AND STATE LEGISLATION
The United States was not the first nation to adopt a com-
prehensive program of unemployment compensation legislation;
such programs were in existence in most European countries at
*B.S. Northwestern University, 1951; LL.B. University of Michigan, 1954.
Member of Nebraska State, Omaha, and American Bar Associations. Pres-
ently associated with the firm of King & Haggart, Omaha, Nebraska.
1 As, for example, in Detroit, Michigan, where unemployment reached
200,000, or 12 % of the working force during the first week of February,
1958. U. S. News & World Report, February 14, 1958, p. 43. As of the
middle of March, 1958, at least 6% of the labor force was unemployed in
70 of 149 of the nation's major employment areas. New York Times,
March 28, 1958, p. 15, cols. 3-4.
20n March 19, 1958, President Eisenhower held a conference with nine
state governors to discuss an emergency plan to extend unemployment
compensation coverage to workers not covered by state acts, and extend
the maximum benefit program period from 26 to 39 weeks. Both of these
objectives would be realized by a loan of Federal funds to the states.
New York Times, March 18, 1958, p. 1, col. 1; Id., March 20, 1958, p. 1, col.
2; Id., March 23, 1958, p. 49, col. 1. As this article goes to press, legislation
is pending in Congress which would realize this purpose.
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the time the Social Security Act was enacted by Congress in 1935. 3
The first American state to adopt unemployment compensation
legislation was Wisconsin, which established a program in 1932.4
Other states were reluctant to follow Wisconsin's lead however,
primarily because of a fear that imposition of an unemployment
tax upon employers within the state would place them at a com-
petitive disadvantage with employers in other states where no
such tax existed.5
It remained, therefore, for the federal government to provide
the impetus for enactment of state unemployment compensation
legislation on a broad scale; this was done as a part of the com-
prehensive social insurance program adopted by Congress on August
14, 1935, popularly known as the Social Security Act.6 Two parts
of this legislation were particularly effective in inducing the states
to enact their own unemployment compensation programs.
One of these, Title IX of the original Social Security Act, was
the Federal Unemployment Tax Act,7 which imposed upon every
employer an excise tax equal to three per cent of the total wages
paid to his employees,8 but provided for credits against this tax up
to ninety per cent thereof if the employer was making payments
to a state unemployment insurance fund pursuant to state un-
employment compensation legislation which had been approved
by the Secretary of Labor." The other, Title III of the original
Social Security Act,10 provided for the payment of federal grants
for the administration of state unemployment compensation funds,
if the state's unemployment compensation legislation had been ap-
3 For a brief discussion of foreign unemployment compensation programs
in effect prior to 1935, see Millis and Montgomery, Labor's Risks and
Social Insurance, 122-137 (1938).
4 Wis. Sess. Laws, Spec. Sess. c. 20 p. 57 (1932).
5 H.R. Rep. No. 615, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1935); S. Rep. No. 628, 74th
Cong., 1st Sess. 11, 13 (1935); Douglas, Social Security in the United
States 20 (1936); Gagliardo, American Social Insurance 232 (rev. ed.
1955); Millis and Montgomery, op. cit. supra note 3, at 145. New Hamp-
shire and New York had enacted legislation in 1935 prior to adoption of
the Social Security Act.
6 Act of August 14, 1935, c. 531, 49 Stat. 620 (codified in scattered sections
of 26, 42 U.S.C.).
7 49 Stat. 639 (1935), U.S.C. § 3301-3306 (Supp. IV, 1957).
s The original act imposed a tax of one per cent on employers' 1936 payrolls,
two per cent on 1937 payrolls, and three per cent on payrolls in 1938 and
thereafter. 49 Stat. 639 (1935), 26 U.S.C. § 3301 (Supp. IV, 1957).
949 Stat. 643 (1935), 26 U.S.C. §§ 3302-3304 (Supp. V, 1957).
1049 Stat. 626 (1935), 42 U.S.C. §§ 501-503 (1953).
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proved by the Secretary of Labor. The requirements which the
state legislation had to meet in order to be approved for purposes
of the tax credit provisions of Title IX and the administrative
grant provisions of Title III were established in the Act.'
Response by the several states to this stimulus of federal legis-
lation was both rapid and unanimous. By June 30, 1937, every
jurisdiction in the nation had adopted a comprehensive scheme of
unemployment legislation.' 2 The Nebraska Unemployment Secur-
ity Law became law upon May 17, 1937.13 All of the state acts,
having of course undergone some amendment in the interim, re-
main on the books today.' 4 In view of the fact that all of the state
laws had to comply with certain federal standards in order to
qualify for the tax credit and administrative grant provisions of
the Social Security Act already mentioned, and in view of the
additional fact that federal agencies actively cooperated in the
drafting of state legislation, 5 it is to be expected that there was
some substantial uniformity among the state laws in their most
important provisions. This same degree of uniformity continues to
prevail at the present time.
It is not within the scope of this article to present a compre-
hensive analysis of the features of state unemployment compensa-
tion legislation.' 6 It is sufficient for our purposes to observe that
after a statutory waiting period, an unemployed worker covered
1149 Stat. 626 (1935), 42 U.S.C. § 503 (1953); 49 Stat. 640 (1935), 26 U.S.C.
H§ 3303-3304 (Supp. IV, 1957).
12The years in which legislation was enacted are as follows: Wisconsin
(1932); Alabama, California, District of Columbia, Massachusetts, New
Hampshire, New York, Oregon (1935); Arizona, Colorado, Connecticut,
Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Michigan,
Minnesota, Mississippi, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Carolina, Ohio,
Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota,
Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, West Virginia (1936); Arkan-
sas, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Kansas, Missouri, Montana, Ne-
braska, Nevada, North Dakota, Washington, Wyoming (1937). For statu-
tory citations, see table, infra, pp. 696-702.
13 Neb. Laws c. 108, p. 369 (1938).
14 The Nebraska Employment Security Law now appears as Neb. Rev. Stat.
H9 48-601--48-669 (Reissue 1952).
15 Gagliardo, op. cit. supra note 5 at 253; Hughes, Principles Underlying
Labor-Dispute Disqualification (1946) p. 3; H.R. Doc. No. 81, 74th Cong.,
1st Sess. 17-19 (1935).
16 For a general discussion of the original Nebraska Act, see Orfield, The
Nebraska Unemployment Compensation Law, 16 Neb. L. Bul. 148 (1937).
Texts on the subject include Millis and Montgomery, op. cit. supra, note 3;
Gagliardo, op. cit. supra, note 5, pp. 250-307.
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by the Act may make a claim for benefits; that if funds are avail-
able, and if the administrators of the fund find that the claimant
is not disqualified from receiving benefits for one of the reasons
enumerated in the statute, payments commence; that payments
continue until the claimant returns to his former job or obtains
other suitable employment, as defined by the statute, but never
for a period of more than thirty weeks; that maximum benefits
range from twenty-five dollars to sixty dollars per week. The
statutes create administrative tribunals and prescribe procedures
for the hearing and determination of disputed claims, and provide
for judicial review of these determinations.
In Nebraska and in most other states, the unemployment com-
pensation trust fund is maintained solely by the contributions of
employers covered by the Act, no contribution being exacted from
the wage earners. 7 In some states, contributions are required of
both employers and employees.' Generally speaking, the amount
of an employer's contribution is determined by applying a percent-
age factor to the wages paid by him to covered employees; the
percentage factor varies from zero to four, depending upon the
volume of claims paid out of the fund on account of unemployment
in the employer's own business enterprise in past periods. In most
states, all payments are made into a single pooled fund; in a few,
a separate account is maintained for each covered employer, con-
tributions being credited to that account, and benefit payments
charged against it.
II. OBJECT AND PURPOSE OF UNEMPLOYMENT
COMPENSATION LEGISLATION
A. FEDERAL LEGISLATION
As stated above,' 9 the Federal Unemployment Tax Act was
enacted as a part of a comprehensive social insurance program.
That such a program was necessary was suggested to Congress by
President Franklin D. Roosevelt in his message of January 17,
1935.20 With respect to the unemployment insurance aspect of the
program, it had been pointed out that much of the economic dis-
17Neb. Rev. Stat. § 48-648 (Reissue 1952).
18 States in which employee contributions are required for unemployment
benefit purposes are Alabama and New Jersey. California, New York and
Rhode Island require employee contributions only for disability benefit
purposes.
'9 Supra, p. 669.
20 H.R. Doc. No. 81, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. v-vii (1935).
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tress which befell wage earners during the depression of the 1930's
could have been alleviated had an adequate unemployment com-
pensation program been in operation during the 1920's. 21 Need-
less to say, the unemployment compensation program proposed by
the President in 1935 was intended by him to combat the con-
sequences of widespread unemployment and hardship brought to
the nation by the severe depression of the 19301s.22 He hoped and
expected that enactment of federal unemployment compensation
legislation containing the tax credit and administrative grant pro-
visions already referred to 23 would induce the states to adopt suit-
able programs of their own.24 He also professed that so long as
state legislation conformed with the requirements established in
the federal act, the administration of the unemployment insurance
funds and the determination of eligibility of claimants should be
left in the hands of state executive and judicial instrumentalities. 25
The President's recommendations concerning the social insur-
ance program were supported by the report of the Committee on
Economic Security;2 6 the committees which reported the proposed
legislation to the floor of the House and Senate likewise approved
it. 27 The reports of all three committees contained the following
findings and recommendations with respect to the Unemployment
Tax Act:
That the cyclical characteristics of the economy required that
unemployment insurance funds be accumulated during periods of
prosperity, so that they would be readily available during periods
of depression for relief of the consequences of unemployment; 28
That if unemployment insurance had been in operation during
the 1920's, much of the economic hardship resulting from unem-
21 Infra, note 29.
22 H.R. Doc. No. 81, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. vii (1935).
23 Supra, p. 669.
24 H.R. Doc. No. 81, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. vi (1935).
25 Ibid.
20 This was a special committee appointed by the President in 1934 to ana-
lyze problems affecting federal social insurance legislation. For an ac-
count of the makeup and activities of this committee, see Douglas, op. cit.
supra, note 5, at 26-83; H. R. Rep. No. 615, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 2-3 (1935);
S. Rep. No. 628, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 2-3 (1935). The report and recom-
mendations of the committee are found in H.R. Doc. No. 81, 74th Cong.,
1st Sess. 8-19 (1935).
27 H.R. Rep. No. 615, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. (1935); S. Rep. No. 628, 74th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1935).
28H.R. Doc. No. 81, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1935); H.R. Rep. No. 615, 74th
Cong., 1st Sess. 3, 7 (1935); S. Rep. No. 628, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1935).
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ployment during the depression of the 1930's could have been
relieved; 29
That the tax credit and administrative grant provisions of the
program were intended primarily to induce the states to adopt un-
employment insurance programs of their own;30
That administration of the program, insofar as possible, should
be left to the states.3 1
The federal unemployment insurance legislation, together with
the remainder of the proposed social insurance program, was
speedily approved by both houses of Congress, and the measure
became law on August 14, 1935.32
It seems evident from the committee reports presented at the
time the federal unemployment insurance legislation was enacted
that the overriding purpose of Congress was to provide a means
of combating the severe hardships and distress of unemployment
resulting from cyclical depression.33 The Courts have so inter-
preted the federal act.34
To what extent were the framers of the federal unemploy-
ment insurance legislation concerned with the payment of benefits
when unemployment was in some way related to a labor dispute
or to the principles of trade unionism? Title IX35 provided that the
state acts could not be approved by the Secretary of Labor if
compensation were to be denied to any otherwise eligible individual
for refusing to accept new work, if the position offered was vacant
due directly to a strike, lockout, or other labor dispute36 or if, as
29 H.R. Doc. No. 81, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1935); H.R. Rep. No. 615, 74th
Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1935); S. Rep. No. 628, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 10, 15
(1935).
30 H.R. Doc. No. 81, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 11, 19 (1935); H.R. Rep. No. 615,
74th Cong., 1st Sess. 8-9 (1935); S. Rep. No. 628, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 12
(1935).
31 H.R. Doc. No. 81, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1935); H.R. Rep. No. 615, 74th
Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1935); S. Rep. No. 628, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 12, 13
(1935).
32 Act of August 14, 1935, c. 531, 49 Stat. 620 (classified in scattered sections
of 26, 42 U.S.C.).
33 Supra, notes 22, 28 and 29.
34 StoWs V. United States, 55 F.Supp. 230 (E.D.Pa. 1943); Fahs v. Tree-Gold
Co-op Growers of Florida, 166 F.2d 40 (5th Cir. 1948); Schwing v. United
States, 165 F.2d 518 (3rd Cir. 1948); Personal Finance Co. of Braddock v.
United States, 86 F.Supp. 779 (Del. 1949); Hearst Publications v. United
States, 70 F.Supp. 666 (N.D. Cal. 1946), aff'd 168 F.2d 751 (9th Cir. 1948).
35 49 Stat. 640 (1935), 26 U.S.C. § 3304 (a) (5) (Supp. IV, 1957).
36 Ibid.
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a condition of being re-employed, the individual would be required
to join a company union or resign from or refrain from joining any
bona fide labor organization 7 Thus Congress forbade the with-
holding of benefits as an economic sanction to force a worker to
become a "scab" or "strike-breaker", or to force him to join or
refrain from joining a labor union. Further than this the legisla-
tors did not go, and if the absence of legislation and the absence of
any discussion in the committee reports relating to this legislation
are indicative, Congress did not anticipate in detail the problems
which would arise when workers claimed benefits when their own
unemployment was related either directly or indirectly to a labor
dispute.
B. STATE LEGISLATION
The paucity of written reports containing the history of en-
actment of state unemployment compensation legislation renders
it difficult to ascertain the legislative intent surrounding the adop-
tion of these acts. Little help is found in court decisions, beyond
the observation that the state acts were adopted to combat the
effects of unemployment due to depression.38
Undoubtedly many of the same factors which induced the
federal legislators to enact the Federal Unemployment Tax Act
also influenced state lawmakers. As suggested above, some of
these conditions were wide-spread unemployment during the 1930's;
realization that some of the severe consequences of the depression
of the 1920's could have been alleviated had an unemployment
insurance program then been in effect; acceptance of a cyclical
theory of employment and of the necessity of providing a fund to
cushion the effects of future unemployment.39
But it is probably erroneous to ascribe the adoption of the state
acts entirely to concern of the lawmakers for the plight of the wage
37 Ibid.
3 8 E.g., Rivard v. Bijou Furniture Co., 61 R.I. 251, 21 A.2d 563 (1941), con-
formed to 68 R.I. 358, 27 A.2d 853 (1941); Lion Oil Refining Co. v. McCain,
204 Ark. 995, 166 S.W.2d 249 (1942); Bogue Electric Co. v. Board of Review
of Division of Employment Security, 21 N.J. 431, 122 A.2d 615 (1956);
Beaman v. Safeway Stores, 78 Ariz. 195, 277 P. 2d 1010 (1954); T.R. Miller
Mill Co. v. Johns, 261 Ala. 615, 75 So.2d 675 (1955); Duteau v. Salvucci,
330 Mass. 531, 115 N.E.2d 726 (1953); New Haven Market Exchange v.
Administrator, Unemployment Compensation Act, 139 Conn. 709, 97 A.2d
262 (1953); Com. Life & Acc. Ins. Co. v. Board of Review, 414 Ill. 475, 111
N.E.2d 345 (1953).
39 Supra, p. 672.
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earner in times of unemployment; on the contrary - adoption of
the legislation was politically expedient. Valid federal legislation
had been enacted which imposed a tax upon employers within a
state, but allowed a credit equal to ninety per cent of that tax if
payments were made into a state fund; and federal funds were
available which would in large measure defray the costs of ad-
ministration of the fund. Under these circumstances - when the
tax could be so painlessly imposed; when the administration of the
fund could so easily be kept in the hands of the state government
at little, if any, additional expense to the electorate; when the de-
sire to "keep the money at home" instead of "sending it to Wash-
ington" could be so effectively gratified - it is hardly surprising
that the state legislatures fell into line with alacrity.
As in the case of the federal legislation, there is very little in
the background surrounding enactment of the state unemployment
compensation acts to indicate that their framers were possessed
of any particular conviction as to whether a claimant should be
paid benefits when his unemployment was in some way related to
a labor dispute or to adherence to the principles of trade union-
ism. In contrast to the federal legislation, the state acts do contain
provisions specifically relating to these problems. The courts have
been obliged to construe these provisions notwithstanding the
lack of meaningful indicia of legislative intent. The nature and
scope of these provisions, and the judicial construction placed
upon them, are discussed in the next section of this article.
III. LABOR DISPUTE DISQUALIFICATION PROVISIONS
As previously stated, the central problem to be treated in this
article is: To what extent should unemployment compensation
benefits be available to employees when their unemployment is
due to a labor dispute; or, to state the problem somewhat different-
ly, what degree of identification with the labor dispute should be
permitted an employee before he is held to be ineligible for bene-
fits?
It is appropriate first to survey the several types of statutory
provisions for disqualification when unemployment is due to a
labor dispute. Thereafter, because of the lack of judicial con-
struction of legislative intent relating to this central problem, it
will become necessary to examine some of the extraneous cir-
cumstances which existed at the time this legislation was enacted,
and from such examination to attempt to ascertain whether any
such intent properly may be imputed. Finally, we shall consider
the applicability of this legislation to present-day collective bar-
gaining and labor relations conditions.
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A. SUIvEy OF LABOR-DISPUTE DISQUALIFICATION PROVISIONS
It can be seen by reference to the table on the following
pages, 40 that the labor-dispute disqualification provisions of the
Nebraska Employment Security Law are substantially identical in
all or most respects to those of about three-fourths of the other
jurisdictions in the country.41 It is therefore appropriate to con-
sider the Nebraska provisions as typical, and to refer to provisions
of other states only when they are significantly different.
1. "Stoppage of Work"
The disqualification provisions stipulate that a claimant's un-
employment must be the result of a "stoppage of work" at the
place where he was last employed. It is obvious that where opera-
tions in an employer's plant or establishment are completely halted
as a result of a labor dispute, there is a "stoppage of work" within
the meaning of the statute.42 But some courts have construed the
term to have a broader meaning. The Nebraska Supreme Court, for
example, has held that a "substantial curtailment of work" is
sufficient to satisfy the requirements of the statute,43 and that such
curtailment may occur in three ways: (1) by the cessation of
work by all or a part of the employees; (2) by the cessation of
work by a part of the employees which disables the employer
from utilizing the services of other employees; (3) by a diminution
41 Infra, pp. 696-702.
41 The labor-dispute disqualification provision of the Nebraska Employment
Security Law (Sec. 48-628 [d]) provides that a claimant shall be ineligible
for benefits:
For any week with respect to which the commissioner finds that his
total unemployment is due to a stoppage of work which exists because
of a labor dispute at the factory, establishment or other premises at
which he is or was last employed; Provided, that this subsection shall
not apply if it is shown to the satisfaction of the commissioner that (1)
he is not participating in or financing or directly interested in the labor
dispute which caused the stoppage of work, and (2) he does not belong
to a grade or class of workers of which, immediately before the com-
mencement of the stoppage, there were members employed at the
premises at which the stoppage occurs, any of whom are participating
in or financing or directly interested in the dispute; Provided, that if
in any case separate branches of work which are commonly conducted
as separate businesses in separate premises, are conducted in separate
departments of the same premises, each such department shall, for the
purposes of this subsection, be deemed to be a separate factory, estab-
lishment or other premises.
42 Courts are seldom called upon to construe the term, because in most
cases the stoppage of work is complete, at least within the claimant's
particular plant or department.
4 3 Magner v. Kinney, 141 Neb. 122, 2 N.W.2d 689 (1942).
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of patronage by customers or the public of the employing establish-
ment which produces a compensating unemployment of workers.44
Moreover, it has been held that the term refers to a cessation or
curtailment of work at the plant or establishment where the
claimant is employed, and not to a cessation of work by the
claimant himself.45 Thus, even if the claimant himself is willing
to continue work, but is unable to do so because of the action of
others, he is not saved from disqualification by virtue of the "work
stoppage" provision of the statute.
2. "Labor Dispute"
The stoppage of work which causes a claimant's unemployment
must be due to a "labor dispute" if the claimant is to be held dis-
qualified under the relevant provisions of the statute. Clearly a
strike is a "labor dispute" within the meaning of the statute.
Whether particular species of disagreements, such as jurisdictional
disputes, organizational controversies between unions, representa-
tion disputes between unions, and controversies over hours and
other conditions of work are "labor disputes" are questions which
the courts are seldom called upon to decide; these disagreements
usually culminate in a strike or a lockout, which is the immediate
cause of the work stoppage. 46
When the work stoppage is due to a lockout,47 there is consider-
able variance among the jurisdictions as to whether or not a
claimant will be disqualified. In some states, lockouts are classi-
44 Ibid.
45 Ibid. Cf. Board of Review v. Mid-Continent Petroleum Corp., 193 Okla.
36, 141 P.2d 69 (1943).
4 6 The term "labor dispute" has been defined as any controversy concern-
ing wages, hours, working conditions or terms of employment. Local
Union No. 222 v. Gordon, 406 Ill. 145, 92 N.E.2d 739 (1950); Amory Wor-
sted Mills v. Riley, 96 N.H. 162, 71 A.2d 788 (1950); Ablondi v. Board of
Review, 8 N.J. Super. 71, 73 A.2d 262 (1950). It has been held that juris-
dictional disputes between unions are "labor disputes." Westinghouse
Electric Corp. v. Unemployment Comp. Board of Review, 165 Pa. Super.
385, 68 A.2d 393 (1949); In re Deep River Timber Co. Employees, 8 Wash.
2d 179, 111 P.2d 575 (1941). Cf. Board of Review v. Hix, 126 W.Va. 538,
29 S.E. 2d 618 (1944). Likewise, a controversy between employees and
their union or bargaining agency has been held a "labor dispute," if it
affects terms or conditions of employment. Duquesne Brewing Co. v.
Unemployment Comp. Board of Review, 359 Pa. 535, 59 A.2d 913 (1948).
47The term "lockout" is used herein in the limited sense of a temporary
closing down of his plant by an employer during a dispute for the purpose
of forestalling economic loss, or for the purpose of achieving an economic
or other purpose not declared unlawful by federal or state labor relations
laws.
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fled as labor disputes by the express language of the statute. 8 In
others, the statutes specifically state that a lockout shall not be
deemed a labor dispute,49 and it usually follows that the unem-
ployed claimant is not disqualified. In still other states, the statutes
simply state that a claimant shall not be disqualified from receiving
benefits when his unemployment is due to a lockout30 thus reach-
ing the same result by a more direct route. In jurisdictions where
the question of lockouts is not specifically provided for in the
statutes, the authorities are not in harmony.r'
It is submitted that in these latter jurisdictions, the better
considered decisions are those in which an employee is disqualified
from receiving benefits when unemployed because of a lockout due
to a dispute between an employer and his employees. In recent
years there has been increasing judicial recognition that in some
circumstances the lockout is an instrument of coercive economic
power co-ordinate with the strike,52 and that the right of employers
to use this weapon for the furtherance of their legitimate objec-
tives in collective bargaining is co-ordinate with that of the union
to utilize the strike for similar purposes. 3 This proposition has
recently received limited approval by the United States Supreme
Court.5 4 Moreover, there is nothing in the language of the labor-
dispute disqualification provisions of most statutes which justifies
differentiation in eligibility for benefits on the basis of the cause
of the work stoppage, so long as the stoppage is due to a labor dis-
48 E.g., Neb. Rev. Stat., §48-628 (c) (2) (i) (Supp. 1955), refers to "a strike,
lockout, or other labor dispute."
49 See statutory provisions of Kentucky and Ohio cited in table, pp. 697, 700,
infra.
50 See statutory provisions of Arkansas, Connecticut, Minnesota, New Hamp-
shire and West Virginia cited in table, pp. 696-702, infra.
51 Where there is no statutory provision to the contrary, a lockout is held
to constitute a "labor dispute." Adkins v. Indiana Employment Security
Division, 117 Ind.App. 132, 70 N.E.2d 31 (1946); In Re North River Log-
ging Co., 15 Wash.2d 204, 130 P.2d 64 (1942).
52Leonard v. N.L.R.B., 205 F.2d 355 (9th Cir. 1953); cf. American Brake
Shoe Co., 116 N.L.R.B. 820 (1956); enforcement denied American Brake
Shoe Co. v. N.L.R.B., 244 F.2d 489 (7th Cir. 1957). See also Morand
Bros. Beverages Co. v. N.L.R.B., 204 F.2d 529 (7th Cir. 1953).
53 Ibid.
54 N.L.R.B. v. Teamsters Local 449, 353 U.S. 87 (1957). But the Court stated:
"We thus find it unnecessary to pass upon the question whether, as a
general proposition, the employer lockout is the corollary of the employ-
ees' statutory right to strike." 353 U.S. 93, n. 19.
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pute;55 courts which hold claimants not disqualified in the event
of lockouts, are therefore, reading into the statute a requirement
that the act which proximately precipitates the work stoppage
must be voluntary so far as the employees are concerned. This con-
struction would seem to be contrary to the tradition of neutrality
of the state in labor disputes which is implicit in most state unem-
ployment compensation acts.'0
Most statutes do not require that the labor dispute be between
the employer and the claimant himself. Indeed, in view of the
typical statutory provisions for exception from disqualification,
the only reasonable construction would seem to be that there is
no such requirement.57
3. Removal of Disqualification
If it is found that the work stoppage which caused the claim-
ant's unemployment is due to a labor dispute at the premises where
he was last employed, the claimant is disqualified from receiving
benefits. Whether or not this disqualification can be removed de-
pends upon the provisions of the applicable statute.
In several jurisdictions, disqualification is absolute so long as
the unemployment remains due to a labor dispute in active prog-
ress.SS In New York, disqualification appears to be absolute, but
is removed if the claimant's unemployment lasts for a period of
more than seven weeks. 9 In Rhode Island, the statute provides for
the same exceptions from disqualification as appear in the Nebraska
and similar statutes, but removes the disqualification if unemploy-
:',:',Accord: Fash v. Gordon, 398 Ill. 210, 75 N.E.2d 294 (1947); Local Union
No. 222 v. Gordon, 406 Ill. 145, 92 N.E.2d 739 (1950).
36 Infra, pp. 685-689.
37 If the construction were otherwise, provisions such as those found in Sec.
48-628 (d) (1), (2), note 41, supra, would be superfluous; if a claimant
were personally engaged in a labor dispute with his employer, he would
be unable to make a showing that he was not 'participating" or "directly
interested" in such dispute.
5This appears to be true in Alabama, California, Delaware, Kentucky,
Minnesota, Ohio and Wisconsin. But in Kentucky and Minnesota the
claimant is not disqualified if his unemployment is due to a lockout. See
table, infra, pp. 696-702. In California, the courts have developed a "vo-
litional" test, the effect of which is to remove disqualification when the
claimant's unemployment is found to be "involuntary." Bodinson Mfg.
Co. v. California Employment Commission, 17 Cal.2d 321, 109 P.2d 935(1941); Bunny's Waffle Shop v. California Employment Commission, 24
Cal.2d 735, 151 P.2d 224 (1944); McKinley v. California Employment
Commission, 34 Cal.2d 239, 209 P.2d 602 (1949).
59 N.Y. Consol, Laws, Art. 18, Ch. 31, §592.
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ment lasts more than six weeks beyond the claimant's statutory
waiting period.60
In Nebraska and most other jurisdictions, disqualification is not
absolute, and can be removed upon a showing that the claimant
was not "participating" in, "financing," or "directly interested" in
the labor dispute which caused his unemployment, and that he did
not belong to the same "grade or class" as workers who were so
"participating," "financing," or "directly interested."61 These terms
have been the subject of extensive judicial construction, which will
be discussed in subsequent sections of this article.
It should be pointed out that the language of the statutes re-
quires that a showing must be made that the claimant is within
all of the exceptions before his disqualification is removed.
It is usually held that the burden is upon the claimant to prove
that he satisfies all of the statutory requirements for exception from
disqualification.6 2 To place the burden of making such a showing
upon the claimant seems entirely proper, because the evidentiary
facts relating to questions of participation, financing, and direct
interest are usually exclusively within the knowledge of the claim-
ant and his union representatives; to hold otherwise would impose
upon the employer the difficult and sometimes impossible burden
of extricating these facts from witnesses often hostile, uncoopera-
tive, or evasive. Moreover, once it has been established that the
claimant's unemployment is due to a labor dispute, it would seem
more in accord with the tradition of state neutrality implicit in
61 R.I. Gen. Laws 1938, Ch. 284, §7.
61 Not all of the quoted terms are contained in every statute of the Nebraska
type. See table, infra, pp. 696-702.
62 A. Borchmann Sons v. Carpenter, 166 Neb. 322, 35 S.C.J. 322, 89 N.W.2d 123
(1958); Lanyon v. Administrator, Unemployment C. Act, 139 Conn. 20, 89
A.2d 558 (1952); Brown Shoe Co. v. Gordon, 405 Ill. 384, 91 N.E.2d 381
(1950); Auker v. Review Board, 117 Ind.App. 486, 71 N.E.2d 629 (1947);
Lloyd E. Mitchell, Inc. v. Maryland Employment Sec. Bd., 209 Md. 237,
121 A.2d 198 (1956); Martineau v. Director of Div. of Employment Sec.,
329 Mass. 44, 106 N.E.2d 420 (1952); Producers Produce Co. v. Industrial
Commission, 365 Mo. 996, 291 S.W.2d 166 (1956); Schooley v. Bd. of Rev.,
43 N.J. Super. 381, 128 A.2d 708 (1957); State ex rel. Employment Se-
curity Commission v. Jarrell, et al., 231 N.C. 381, 57 S.E.2d 403 (1950);
Kontner v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Rev., 148 Ohio St. 614, 76 N.E.2d
611 (1947); Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. Unemployment Compensation
Board of Review, 165 Pa.Super. 385, 68 A.2d 393 (1949); Re Appeals of
Employees of Polson Lumber and Shingle Mills, 19 Wash.2d 467, 143 P.2d
316 (1943); Copen, et al. v. Hix, et al., 130 W.Va. 343, 43 S.E.2d 382 (1947).
In some states the burden of proof is placed upon the claimant by the
express provisions of the statute. In Michigan, however, the statute places
the burden upon the employer. Mich. Comp. Laws 1948, §421.29.
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the statutes 3 to require the claimant to show that he was not
identified with the dispute, rather than to require the employer to
show that he was.
4. "Participating" in Labor Dispute
In order to escape disqualification under most statutes, the
claimant must show that he was not "participating" in the labor
dispute, within the meaning of the statute. If the labor dispute
is accompanied by picketing of the employer's, premises, and the
claimant himself engages in the picketing, he is obviously "par-
ticipating" in the dispute, and is disqualifed from receiving bene-
fits.
If a picket line is established at the premises where the claim-
ant was employed, and the claimant refuses to cross the picket line,
he is likewise held to be disqualified. 4 This is true even though
the picket line has been established by some union other than the
claimant's, 5 and even though the claimant personally has no dis-
pute with his employer, and has no interest whatever in the out-
come of the dispute.66 It is not entirely clear from the cases whether
there must be an overt refusal upon the part of the claimant to cross
the picket line, in order that he be held disqualified. It is sub-
mitted that no overt act should be required for a finding of partici-
pation, and that a mere failure to cross the picket line is sufficient.
That the members of one union shall honor the picket line of an-
other established at their place of work is a principle of trade
unionism so well known that it is a proper subject of judicial
notice.6 - Likewise, it has been held that claimants who refuse to
cross picket lines solely because of their belief in this principle or
their adherence to it are disqualified from receiving benefits.68
63 Infra, pp. 685-689.
64 Baldassaris v. Egan, 135 Conn. 695, 68 A.2d 120 (1949); American Brake
Shoe Co. v. Annunzio, 405 Ill. 44, 90 N.E.2d 83 (1950); Abshier v. Review
Board, 122 Ind. App. 425, 105 N.E.2d 902 (1952); Andreas v. Bates, 14
Wash.2d 322, 128 P.2d 300 (1942); Brown v. Maryland Unemployment
Compensation Board, 189 Md. 233, 55 A.2d 696 (1947). Likewise, refusal
to cross a picket line is held not to be "involuntary" unemployment
under the California statute. Bodinson lfg. Co. v. California Employ-
ment Commission, 17 Cal.2d 321, 109 P.2d 935 (1941).
65 Each of the cases cited in note 64, supra, is authority for this statement.
6 6 Baldassaris v. Egan, supra, note 64; American Brake Shoe Co. v. Annun-
zio, supra, note 64.
67 See Bodinson Ifg. Co. v. California Employment Commission, supra,
note 64; Baldassaris v. Egan, supra, note 64; American Brake Shoe Co. v.
Annunzio, supra, note 64.
68 Ibid.
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In most instances, there is in fact no overt refusal upon the part
of non-striking workers to cross the picket line-they simply do
not appear at the premises until the pickets have been withdrawn.
Moreover, to require proof of an overt refusal would be in effect
to place the burden of proving disqualification upon the employer;
it has already been seen that in most jurisdictions the burden is
upon the claimant to except himself from disqualification, 69 and to
shift the burden to the employer would be contrary to the tradition
of neutrality of the state implicit in most statutes.-,
In situations where it has been shown that the claimant was
ready and willing to cross the picket lines, but did not do so be-
cause of a fear of violence or bodily harm, it has been held that
the refusal to do so did not constitute "participating" in the dis-
puteY 1
5. "Financing" the Labor Dispute
In order to escape disqualification, the claimant must also
prove that he was not "financing" the labor dispute. Very little
judicial construction of this term is to be found in the cases. Pre-
sumably the legislators had in mind at the time the legislation
was enacted that one who contributed pecuniary support to the
prosecution of a labor dispute in which his employer was involved
should not be eligible for benefits in the event that the dispute
resulted in his unemployment.
Undoubtedly one of the reasons why the term "financing" has
not received much judicial consideration is that in most instances
claimants who might be financing the dispute by virtue of their
payments of union dues or of contributions to their union's strike
fund are held to be disqualified on other grounds, usually on the
ground that because of their membership in the bargaining unit
involved in the dispute, they are "directly interested" therein.7Y2
It is to be noted that in several states specific statutory pro-
visions have been adopted which provide that payment of regular
dues to a union involved in a labor dispute shall not constitute
"financing" the dispute.73
09Supra, note 62.
70 Infra, pp. 685-689.
71 Lanyon v. Administrator, Unemployment Compensation Act, 139 Conn.
20, 89 A.2d 558 (1952); Meyer v. Industrial Commission of Missouri, 240
Mo.App. 1022, 223 S.W.2d 835 (1949).
72 Infra, pp. 683, 684.
73 Such provisions have been adopted in Florida, Massachusetts, and Mich-
igan. For citations to statutes, see table, infra, pp. 696-702.
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6. "Directly Interested" in the Labor Dispute
In order to relieve himself from disqualification, the claimant
must also show that he was not "directly interested" in the labor
dispute which caused his unemployment. Of all the exceptions to
disqualification, this term has been the subject of the most extensive
judicial interpretation; this is true probably because of its adapt-
ability to so many different fact situations.
The definition usually given is that a claimant is "directly
interested" in a labor dispute when his wages, hours, or conditions
of work will be affected favorably or adversely by the outcome.
74
It has been held that he is nonetheless directly interested even
though he does not know until after the settlement of the dispute
whether his wages will be affected.7 Moreover, it has been held
that this interest is not of a remote, contingent, or speculative na-




It is therefore apparent that all members of a collective bargain-
ing unit are directly interested in a dispute which develops between
their employer and their bargaining representatives during negoti-
ations which will affect their wages, hours, or conditions of work.77
This is true even of individuals who are not members of the union
acting as the collective bargaining agent;7 even if they are not
members of any union;79 and even if they do not approve of the
demands which their bargaining agent made, and which are the
basis of the dispute."" Moreover, it is immaterial that the claimant
may not approve of strike action taken by his bargaining agent,"
74 A. Borchman Sons v. Carpenter, 35 S.C.J. 322, 166 Neb. 322, 89 N.W.2d 123
(1958); Martineau v. Director of Division of Employment Security, 329
Mass. 44, 106 N.E.2d 420 (1952); Chrysler Corporation v. Smith, 297
Mich. 438, 298 N.W. 87 (1941); Auker v. Review Board, 117 Ind.App.
486, 71 N.E.2d 629 (1947).
75 Chrysler Corporation v. Smith, supra, note 74.
76 A. Borchman Sons v. Carpenter, supra, note 74, Chrysler Corporation v.
Smith, supra, note 74.
77Huiet v. Boyd, 64 Ga.App. 564, 13 S.E.2d 863 (1941); Auker v. Review
Board, supra, note 74; Local No. 658 v. Brown Shoe Co., 403 Ill. 484, 87
N.E.2d 625 (1949).
7s Auker v. Review Board, supra, note 74.
79 Nobes v. Michigan Unemployment Compensation Commission, 313 Mich.
472, 21 N.W.2d 820 (1946).
80 Huiet v. Boyd, supra, note 77.
81 Ibid.
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and may even have voted against the strike . 2 Likewise, it has been
held that an individual whose wages would be affected by the out-
come of a strike conducted by a union of which he was not a mem-
ber was disqualified because he was "directly interested.
'8 3
In a few jurisdictions it has been held that an individual is not
"directly interested" in a labor dispute unless he is actively financ-
ing or participating in it.8 4 The effect of this interpretation is to
render the "financing" and "participating" terms of the statute
meaningless, and these minority decisions have been criticized for
that reason.8 5 In any event, the usual judicial approach is to give
each of the three terms a separate and independent meaning, and
this approach seems better calculated to effectuate the intention of
the framers of the legislation.
7. Same "Grade or Class"
Having successfully hurdled the three foregoing barriers to
eligibility for benefits, it remains for the claimant to show that he
is not of the same "grade or class" as workers who are participating
in, financing, or directly interested in the labor dispute which
caused his unemployment.
The courts have evolved a number of interpretations of this
term. Some look to the claimant's membership in the union or other
cohesive group involved in the dispute. Under this interpretation,
it has been held that a claimant is disqualified because of the same
"grade or class" (1) when he is a member of the same international
union, although not of the same local, as the one participating in
the dispute;80 (2) when he is a member of the same local union.8 7
Other courts have concluded that the nature of the work per-
formed or of the skill possessed is determinative of "grade or class,"
$2 Ibid.
83 Auker v. Review Board, supra, note 74; Nobes v. Michigan Unemploy-
ment Compensation Commission, supra, note 79.
s4 Kieckhefer Container Co. v. Unemployment Compensation Commission,
125 N.J.L. 52, 13 A.2d 646 (1940); Wickland v. Commissioner of Unem-
ployment Compensation and Placement, 18 Wash.2d 206, 138 P.2d 876
(1943).
3: Huiet v. Boyd, 64 Ga.App. 564, 13 S.E.2d 863 (1941).
80 Copen v. Hix, 130 W.Va. 343, 43 S.E.2d 382 (1947). This case was one in
which different units of the United Mine Workers Union were involved.
Conceivably the rationale of this case could be used as justification for a
finding that all members of the A.F.L.-C.I.O. are of the same grade or
class. The language of the opinion indicates that no such sweeping appli-
cation was anticipated by the West Virginia court; certainly such an ap-
plication would be outlandish.
87 Queener v. Magnet Mills, 179 Tenn. 416, 167 S.W.2d 1 (1942).
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holding that workers performing similar tasks or possessing sim-
ilar skills are of the same "grade or class."'8 In addition, it has been
held that workers in different departments are not necessarily of
different grades or classes,8 9 and that all persons engaged in the
same process of manufacture are of the same grade or class." It
has also been held that workers in a continuous, integrated pro-
duction process, where the performance of one step in the process
is dependent upon the completion of the preceding step, are of the
same "grade or class," 91 regardless of the exact nature of the work
performed by each, and regardless of differences in the degree of
skill required.92
Still other courts hold that all persons who are members of the
collective bargaining unit participating in the dispute are of the
same "grade or class. '93 It is suggested that this interpretation of
the term, as well as the interpretation which holds that member-
ship or non-membership in a union or other cohesive group is de-
terminative, adds little to the meaning of the statute. The defini-
tion of "grade or class" adopted by these courts is difficult to dis-
tinguish from the definition of "directly interested" subscribed to
in most jurisdictions. 94 The two terms were probably intended to
have different meanings by the legislatures.
B. TRADITION OF NEUTRALITY OF THE STATE IN LABOR DIsPuTEs
1. British Legislation and Experience
Prior to the adoption of federal and state unemployment com-
pensation legislation in this country, much had been written about
the British experience with the unemployment insurance program
which was first adopted in England in 1911.95 Undoubtedly many
881n re Deep River Timber Co's Employees, 8 Wash.2d 179, 111 P.2d 575
(1941).
89 Queener v. Magnet Mills, supra, note 87; Local No. 658 v. Brown Shoe
Co., 403 Ill. 484, 87 N.E.2d 625 (1949).
90 Brown Shoe Co. v. Gordon, 405 Ill. 384, 91 N.E.2d 381 (1950).
91 Adams v. Review Board, 121 Ind.App. 273, 98 N.E.2d 681 (1951); Unem-
ployment Compensation Commission v. Lunceford, 229 N.C. 570, 50
S.E.2d 497 (1948).
92 Johnson v. Pratt, 200 S.C. 315, 20 S.E.2d 865 (1942).
93 Brown Shoe Co. v. Gordon, supra, note 90; Local No. 658 v. Brown Shoe
Co., 403 Ill. 484, 87 N.E.2d 625 (1949).
94 Supra, p. 683.
95National Insurance Act, 1-2 Geo. V, Ch. 55 (1911). For treatises and
articles on the British legislation, see Cohen, Insurance Against Unem-
ployment (1921); Douglas and Director, The Problem of Unemployment(1931); Gilson, Unemployment Insurance in Great Britain (1931).
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of the provisions found in American laws were patterned after their
British counterparts, or were framed with a view to meeting prob-
lems which had arisen during more than two decades of administra-
tion of the British Act.90
At the outset, the administrators of the British unemployment
insurance laws maintained an official position of neutrality with
respect to unemployment which occurred as a result of a labor dis-
pute. 7 Under the English law, the cause of the dispute and the
merits of the dispute were immaterial. If unemployment was the
result of a labor dispute, it was not compensable 8 At least two
reasons have been suggested for this policy: (1) it was not con-
sidered wise to permit the fund to be used to finance or subsidize
workers engaged in trade disputes, because it was feared that if
benefits were available to all workers unemployed as a result of
a trade dispute, they would be encouraged to suspend work in
furtherance of their position in the dispute, thereby imposing an
unfair burden upon the employer, and working injury upon the
national economy and upon the public at large; (2) because there
had been no previous experience, it was feared that payment of
benefits when unemployment was due to a labor dispute might cause
a severe drain upon the funds available, thereby defeating the pri-
mary purpose for which the fund was created-the payment of
benefits when unemployment was due to "fluctuations in trade.""
Upon the accession of a Labor Ministry in 1924, the Act was
amended to incorporate certain exceptions to the blanket disqualifi-
cation when unemployment was due to a labor dispute. Legislative
recognition was accorded to the fact that there are some circum-
stances in which a worker may be unemployed because of a labor
dispute even though he has no identification whatever with the
dispute. English lawmakers decided that when such circumstance
existed, the claimant should receive benefits. If a showing could
be made that the claimant was not "participating" or "directly inter-
ested" in the labor dispute, and was not of the "same grade or class"
as workers who were directly participating or interested in the
dispute, he was entitled to receive benefits.10 0 These statutory ex-
'"Hughes, Principles Underlying Labor-Dispute Disqualification, p. 2
(1946); Report of Committee on Economic Security, H.R. Doc. No. 81,
74th Cong., 1st Sess. (1935).
T-Hughes, op. cit. supra, note 96.
9SNational Insurance Act, 1-2 Geo. V, Ch. 55 (1911).
9 Hughes, op. cit. supra, note 96.
100 National Insurance Act, 14-15 Geo. V, Ch. 30 (1924).
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ceptions to the general labor-dispute disqualification were so
framed that it was still theoretically possible for the administrators
of the fund not to consider the merits of the dispute, thereby pre-
serving the state's traditional policy of neutrality.""
The 1924 amendment to the British act also provided that a
worker was eligible for benefits if he was on strike because of his
employer's violation of the trade agreement with his employees." 2
But this change in the act was short-lived. In 1927, upon the recom-
mendation of the Unemployment Insurance Committee, the pro-
vision was repealed.103 The Committee, in support of its recommen-
dation, stated that collective bargaining as well as the authority
and usefulness of associations of employers and employees would
be strengthened by repeal of the amendment. It has been suggested
that the Committee thus subscribed to the belief that collective
bargaining agreements should carry their own sanction instead of
depending upon the government for enforcement through the pay-
ment of unemployment compensation benefits, and that this was
a reiteration of the policy of state neutrality that the administrators
should not be required to decide the issues nor determine the merits
of a labor dispute in order to determine the right to benefits.""
It was in this condition that American legislators found the
British Unemployment Compensation Act when they looked to it
for guidance in the middle 1930's. Assuming that the policy of the
British legislation can properly be imputed to American legislation
patterned upon it, what was that policy?
It has already been seen that the original British legislation
made no provision whatever for the payment of benefits when un-
employment was due to a labor dispute, and it is submitted that
the omission of this provision was consistent with the overriding,
and perhaps exclusive, purpose of the original legislation-that of
protecting workers from the effects of fluctuations in trade caused
by cyclical economic conditions entirely beyond the control of the
individual.
It follows that the insertion in 1924 of a provision allowing
benefits when unemployment was due to a labor dispute-restric-
tive as that provision was-was a departure from the original legis-
lative policy. Unemployment due to a labor dispute has none of
101 Hughes, op. cit. supra, note 96.
102 National Insurance Act, 14-15 Geo. V, Ch. 30 (1924).
103 Hughes, op. cit. supra, note 96.
104 Ibid.
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the cyclical characteristics of unemployment due to economic de-
pression or recession. Neither does it have the same "impersonal"
characteristic. The history of the labor movement is replete with
the ideology of conflict and class strife, and much of that same
ideology permeates collective bargaining negotiations between em-
ployers and employee representatives even today.1' 0 It is conceded
that unemployment due to a labor dispute may seem "impersonal"
to the individual worker when he has no selfish interest in the
outcome of the dispute; but so long as he realizes economic benefits
as a member of a militant labor movement whose leaders espouse
the causes of economic strife and class conflict in their dealings with
management, he must also accept the concomitant burdens inherent
in the espousal of such causes. It is therefore suggested that the
insertion of the labor-dispute provision, which occasioned the entry
of the unemployment compensation program into an area foreign
to that contemplated by the original legislative policy, was inap-
propriate, if not improvident.
It is not for the courts to question the propriety of legislative
policy when clearly expressed, but it is not improper for them to
consider extraneous circumstances such as those suggested in the
preceding paragraph when they are called upon to apply that policy
to situations not provided for in the statute and probably not en-
visioned by the legislators. It is suggested, therefore, that the ex-
ception to the general legislative policy of the unemployment com-
pensation act-that of allowing benefits in certain circumstances
when unemployment is due to a labor dispute-should be strictly
construed.
2. Doctrine of Neutrality of the State in the United States
What has been said of the labor-dispute provisions of the Brit-
ish legislation in the preceding subsection of this article is relevant
to legislation enacted in approximately three-fourths of the Ameri-
can states, which have patterned their labor-dispute provisions upon
the British act.'0 6 The derivation of American legislation from the
British act has been acknowledged by the courts in several of these
jurisdictions.107 Likewise, the doctrine of neutrality of the state has
105 See Millis and Montgomery, Organized Labor (1945), pp. 354-360.
106 The "participating," "financing," and "directly interested" exceptions to
disqualification are derived from the British act. Hughes, op. cit. supra,
note 96. See table, infra, pp. 696-702.
107 Chrysler Corporation v. Smith, 297 Mich. 438, 298 N.W. 87 (1941); Saun-
ders v. Maryland Unemployment Compensation Bd., 188 Md. 677, 53
A.2d 579 (1948).
UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION
been approved by American courts, 08 which have held that the
legislative purpose underlying state unemployment compensation
acts was not to provide benefits when the worker was without
employment because of his own fault or by his own consent; 10 9 that
the legislation was not intended to compel employers to finance
their employees when they are engaged in coercive action against
them;' 0 and that it was not intended to coerce employers to sub-
mit to the demands of their striking employees."'
It is erroneous to assume that conduct and tactics of both em-
ployers and employee representatives in collective bargaining ne-
gotiations are not influenced by the labor-dispute provisions of ap-
plicable unemployment compensation legislation and the judicial
construction thereof. It must be remembered that in almost all
states, 1 2 unemployment compensation funds are supported solely
by employer contributions and every dollar paid out to claimants
during unemployment due to a labor dispute must be replaced by
a dollar from an employer's pocket. Therefore, it is clearly in the
employer's pecuniary interest to avoid a work stoppage due to a
labor dispute when there is any possibility that some of his em-
ployees will be found eligible for benefits. To avoid the stoppage,
the employer may be inclined to make concessions which he would
otherwise refuse to make. On the other hand, the willingness of
employee collective bargaining representatives to undertake strike
action or other action precipitating a work stoppage is undoubtedly
influenced by whether or not at least some of the employees will
be eligible for benefits. In the absence of legislation or judicial
authority to prevent its use as such, the value of an employer-sup-
ported unemployment compensation fund as a "strike fund" is
immense. Thus it is apparent that the labor-dispute provisions of
state unemployment compensation legislation are of very real im-
portance to both labor and management as they plan and carry out
their collective bargaining strategy.
108 Unemployment Compensation Commission v. Lunceford, 229 N.C. 570,
50 S.E.2d 497 (1948).
109 Jones v. California Employment Security Comm., 120 Cal.App.2d 770,
262 P.2d 91 (1953); Baker v. Powhatan Mining Co., 146 Ohio St. 600,
67 N.E.2d 714 (1946); Local Union No. 11 v. Gordon, 396 Ill. 293, 71
N.E.2d 637 (1947).
"i0 Deshler Broom Factory v. Kinney, 140 Neb. 889, 2 N.W.2d 332 (1942);
Bodinson Mfg. Co. v. California Employment Commission, 17 Cal.2d
321, 109 P.2d 935 (1941); Saunders v. Maryland Unemployment Compen-
sation Bd., 188 Md. 677, 53 A.2d 579 (1948).
i' Deshler Broom Factory v. Kinney, 140 Neb. 889, 2 N.W.2d 332 (1942).
112The exceptions are Alabama and New Jersey. See note 18, supra.
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C. APPLICATION OF LABOR-DISPUTE DISQUALIFICATION PROVISIONS TO
MODERN COLLECTIVE BARGAINING CONDITIONS
During the two decades that unemployment compensation leg-
islation has been in force, collective bargaining techniques utilized
by both employers and employee bargaining agents have under-
gone considerable evolution. Whether the framers of the original
legislation could have foreseen this evolution is improbable. Even
if they did envision it, it is doubtful that they hesitated long, in
their haste" 3 to enact legislation acceptable to federal authorities,
to contemplate its implications. Generally speaking, the labor-
dispute provisions of the state acts have undergone very little sig-
nificant legislative revision since they were originally adopted." 4
It has therefore remained largely for the courts, working with-
out the benefit of much meaningful legislative history, to construe
and interpret the provisions so that they would have some rational
application to ever-changing collective bargaining conditions. In
discharging this responsibility, they have developed a substantial
body of precedent. In concluding this article, it is appropriate to
summarize the application of this precedent to some of the common
collective bargaining situations, and to note the manner in which
the courts have disposed of a few of the more complex problems
which have arisen in connection with multi-employer and multi-
union bargaining arrangements.
1. Summary of Application of Labor-Dispute Provisions
Assuming that there is a stoppage of work due to a labor dis-
pute at the premises where he was last employed, there is authority
for holding a claimant disqualified from receiving benefits under
the following circumstances:
(1) If he is a member of the bargaining unit, and the outcome
of the dispute will affect his wages, hours or conditions of work,
on the ground that he is "directly interested";
(2) If he is not a member of the bargaining unit, but the out-
come of the dispute will nevertheless affect his wages, hours, or
conditions of work, on the same ground;
(3) If he is not a member of the bargaining unit, and even
if his wages, hours, or conditions of work will not be affected, if
he engages in a strike, slow-down or other action evidencing sym-
1'The reader will recall that unemployment compensation acts were
adopted in 47 states within a period of about 2 years. Supra, note 12.
114The Nebraska labor-dispute disqualification provisions have undergone
only technical amendments since their original adoption.
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pathy with those engaged in the dispute, on the ground that he is
"participating" in the dispute;
(4) If he fails or refuses to cross a picket line established by
those engaged in the dispute, on the ground that he is "participat-
ing" in the dispute, unless such failure or refusal is due to a reason-
able apprehension of violence or physical injury;
(5) If he leaves his work after a picket line has been estab-
lished by those engaged in the dispute, on the ground that he is
"participating" in the dispute;
(6) If the nature of his work is the same as those actively en-
gaged in the dispute, on the ground that he is of the same "grade
or class";
(7) If he is working in the same process of manufacture as
those actively engaged in the dispute, on the same ground;
(8) If he works -in a continuous, integrated production process,
in which his work is dependent upon that of persons actively en-
gaged in the dispute, on the same ground.
2. Special Problems
It is to be noted that most of the decisions involve circum-
stances in which the employees are organized into "industrial"
unions. The typical industrial union includes as members all
workers (sometimes with the exception of foremen, watchmen,
supervisory personnel or office employees) employed within the
employer's plant or a department thereof. Thus the collective bar-
gaining authority of an industrial union usually extends to all of
the workers within the plant or department, and the bargaining unit
typically is more or less coextensive with membership in the union.
When a labor dispute develops, it involves all or most of the workers
at the plant. Evidence of participation or direct interest is clear
under these circumstances, and the application of the labor-dispute
provision is relatively uncomplicated.
A considerably more complex situation exists, however, when
employees are organized on a "craft" basis, i.e., on the basis of
the skills they possess and the mechanical nature of the work they
perform. In most cases members of a single union are employed
by several different employers at different plants or establishments.
Thus the union is obliged to deal with several different employers
when it negotiates collective bargaining contracts for its members.
On the other hand, it is likely that an employer in an industry
which is organized on a craft basis will have members of several
different craft unions working for him in a single plant. It is readily
apparent that this difference in form of union organization may
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call for a different result when the labor-dispute provisions of
state unemployment compensation acts are applied. This is espe-
cially true in the case of the typical "directly interested" provision,
as can be seen by this example: Employer R has working for him
at a single establishment members of craft unions A, B, and C.
A labor dispute develops between R and union A concerning
wages, and the members of union A go on strike against R to en-
force their collective bargaining demands. The members of union
A are clearly "directly interested" in the dispute, and are therefore
disqualified from receiving benefits. But what of the members of
unions B and C? Their wages, hours, and working conditions are
not affected by the dispute between R and A, and consequently
they are probably not "directly interested."
If union A places pickets on the job, and the members of
unions B and C refuse to cross the picket line, they will be dis-
qualified from receiving benefits because they are "participating"
in the dispute. But in many instances R will be forced to close
down his establishment even though union A is not picketing, be-
cause he cannot continue to operate it in an efficient manner with-
out the services of the members of union A. In this latter case,
members of union B and C will probably be eligible for benefits,
to the economic detriment of R.
One industry in which situations similar to those outlined in
the foregoing example frequently arise is the building construction
industry. Building construction workers are organized almost ex-
clusively on a craft basis; members of a single union work for many
different contractors, and each contractor employs members of
several different unions on a single project. In order to facilitate
collective bargaining under these circumstances, and for other rea-
sons, the contractors frequently organize themselves into employ-
ers associations which are designated as collective bargaining agents
for all members. Likewise, the several craft unions frequently as-
sociate themselves together into building trades councils, 115 which
may act as collective bargaining agent for its members, and which
in any event often serve as the central clearing house for strategy
115 At the national level, the Building and Construction Trades Department
is a duly constituted branch of the A.F.L.-C.I.O. Its membership con-
sists of 19 international unions whose members are employed in the
construction industry. U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Sta-
tistics, Directory of National and International Labor Unions in the
United States (1957), p. 21. The existence of local councils is provided
for in the A.F.L.-C.I.O. Constitution, and membership at the local level
usually consists of all unions active in the construction industry in the
trade area.
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and tactics, thus providing the central vehicle through which the
unions maintain their cohesiveness and solidarity in collective bar-
gaining.116
It was against this background of collective bargaining condi
tions that the Supreme Court of Nebraska interpreted the labor-
dispute provisions of the state unemployment compensation act.
Collective bargaining negotiations were undertaken between the
contractors' employers association and several craft unions, all of
which were members of the local building trades council. Each
union, however, acted as collective bargaining agent for its own
members, and customarily executed separate agreements with the
employers association. The contracts between the several unions
and the employers association had expired when union A went on
strike against members of the employers association, placing pickets
on some projects being operated by its members. Thereupon all
of the members of the employers association closed down all of
their projects. Members of union B and C claimed unemployment
compensation benefits. It was shown that no pickets had been
placed on the jobs on which the claimants were employed, but that
it was impossible for the contractors to continue work in an effi-
cient manner without the services of the members of union A. It
was further shown that membership in the local building trades
council united unions A, B, and C in a compact body, with a com-
mon interest, to promote that which was advantageous for the
common good of all. The court found that by virtue of their mem-
bership in their respective central organizations, both employers
and unions were in a position to use their combined strength to
enforce economic sanctions against the other. The court held that
claimants, members of unions B and C, were disqualified from
receiving benefits because they had failed to sustain the burden
of proving that they were not "directly interested" in the labor
dispute between the employers association and union A. 117
A third claimant in the same case was a member of union D.
Union A had placed pickets on the project upon which he was em-
ployed, and the claimant left the job. Without deciding whether
the claimant was "participating" in the dispute by refusing to work
behind a picket line, the court held that this claimant was also
116 In addition to assisting their members in collective bargaining, the local
building trades councils attempt to mediate jurisdictional disputes
among members, secure the payment of union-scale wages on all work,
etc.
117 A. Borchman Sons v. Carpenter, 35 S.C.J. 322, 166 Neb. 322, 89 N.W.2d
123 (1958).
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
disqualified because he had not shown that he was not "directly
interested" in the dispute between the employers association and
Union A." 8
The court does not elaborate upon the rationale of its decision,
but it seems reasonable to infer that because of their common mem-
bership in the local building trades council, through which they
were able to exert vast coercive economic pressure upon the em-
ployers association, the claimants were found to have something
more than a remote or speculative interest in the dispute. More-
over, in view of the fact that collective bargaining contracts be-
tween the employers association and unions B and C were in the
process of negotiation at the time the work stoppage occurred, the
court must have concluded that the wages, hours and conditions of
work of members of these unions would be affected by the outcome
of the dispute.
This decision is of considerable significance, not only in the
building construction industry, but in all other industries where
collective bargaining negotiations are carried on through employer
associations and central union organizations. In these circumstances
the interest of the union members in a labor dispute may be more
circuitous and more difficult of recognition, but it is probably no
more speculative nor remote. The existence of a complex structure
of union organizations, affiliations, and associations, by virtue of
which workers realize many advantages in collective bargaining,
should not be permitted to conceal their identification with the
labor dispute. The recent decision of the Supreme Court of Ne-
braska is one of the first in which this proposition has received
judicial approval." 9
IV. CONCLUSION
Available indicia of legislative purpose and intent surrounding
the adoption of state unemployment compensation legislation
plainly show that the primary purpose of such legislation was to
118 Ibid.
119 See also Olaf Nelson Construction Co. v. Division of Employment Se-
curity, 121 Utah 525, 243 P.2d 951 (1953), in which the court, interpret-
ing disqualification provisions somewhat different from the Nebraska-
type provisions, reached a similar conclusion on similar facts. Another
case involving a multi-employer bargaining unit, and presenting an
interesting study in collective bargaining tactics, is McKinley v. Cali-
fornia Employment Stabilization Commission, 34 Cal.2d 239, 209 P.2d
602 (1949).
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relieve workers and their families from some of the consequences
of unemployment due to cyclical economic depression. The causes
of such unemployment are entirely beyond the control of the indi-
vidual worker and are therefore entirely "impersonal" to him.
Moreover, a worker's unemployment, when due to these causes,
is devoid"of any volitional element, and is therefore entirely "in-
voluntary" as far as he is concerned.
Provisions for the payment of benefits when unemployment is
due to a labor dispute, even under strictly limited conditions, are
somewhat anomalous when the primary object and purpose of un-
employment compensation programs are considered, because such
unemployment is neither "involuntary" nor "impersonal" in the
same sense as when due to economic depression. There has there-
fore developed in the American judiciary, partly as a result of
British experience and partly because of independent recognition
of the anomaly of the labor-dispute provisions, a reluctance to al-
low benefits to a worker whose interests can in any way be identi-
fied with the labor dispute which caused his unemployment. This
conservatism, arrived at through a process of legitimate judicial
construction and interpretation, is in accord with the fundamental
purpose of unemployment compensation programs.
The unemployment compensation acts were adopted as an
integral part of a comprehensive federal-state social insurance pro-
gram. In addition to its unemployment compensation features, this
program was designed to relieve the social evils attendant upon old
age, disability, and dependency among children, which are now
generally conceded to be proper subjects for remedial govern-
mental action; likewise many would concede that the relief of
widespread unemployment when due to a depression such as the
one which the nation endured in the 1930's is a proper govern-
mental function. But it is not yet agreed that the payment of bene-
fits to workers whose unemployment is attributable to disputes
between labor and management, as they vie with one another in
the continuing contest for relative economic advantage, is a proper
function of the state. The doctrine of neutrality of the state is there-
fore valid and timely. It is well that the courts of the nation have
been astute in the recognition and application of that doctrine.
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